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Preferences for Flexibility and Randomization 
under Uncertainty †
By Kota Saito *
An uncertainty-averse agent prefers betting on an event whose 
probability is known, to betting on an event whose probability is 
unknown. Such an agent may randomize his choices to eliminate 
the effects of uncertainty. For what sort of preferences does a 
randomization eliminate the effects of uncertainty? To answer this 
question, we investigate an agent’s preferences over sets of acts. 
We axiomatize a utility function, through which we can identify the 
agent’s subjective belief that a randomization eliminates the effects 
of uncertainty. (JEL D11, D81)
People often prefer to bet on a risky event (an event whose probability is known) 
rather than an uncertain event (an event whose probability is unknown). Such a 
preference is said to be uncertainty-averse. (See Gilboa 2009 for a formal definition 
of uncertainty aversion.) If you have such a preference, one way to make a choice 
is to toss a coin.
For example, consider a bet on which country, A or B, will win the final match of 
FIFA World Cup. If your bet turns out to be correct, you obtain  $100 ; otherwise you 
obtain  $0 . The problem is that you do not necessarily have a probabilistic assess-
ment on which country will win. Suppose that you toss a fair coin and you bet on A 
if heads appears; otherwise, you bet on B. Then, no matter which country wins, you 
can obtain the fifty-fifty lottery between  $100 and  $0 .
Yet, are you really indifferent between tossing a fair coin and obtaining the 
 fifty-fifty lottery between  $100 and  $0 ? In other words, do you really think the coin 
toss eliminates the effects of uncertainty?
This is just one example of many economic decisions under uncertainty. For what 
sort of preferences does a randomization eliminate the effects of uncertainty? To 
answer the question, we investigate an agent’s preferences over sets of alternatives. 
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We axiomatize a utility function, through which we can identify the agent’s subjec-
tive belief that his randomization eliminates the effects of uncertainty.
In the next section, we review Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox and Raiffa’s (1961) 
critique. Then, in Section II, we preview our results.
I. Ellsberg’s (1961) Paradox and Raiffa’s (1961) Critique
To give a concrete example of choice under uncertainty, consider the following 
hypothetical experiment first described by Ellsberg (1961). Suppose that you con-
front two urns containing red and black balls. You have the following information: 
Urn I contains 100 red and black balls, but in a ratio entirely unknown to you; there 
may be from 0 to 100 red balls. In Urn II, you know that there are exactly 50 red 
and 50 black balls. We call Urn I the uncertain urn and call Urn II the risky urn, 
respectively.1
To bet on a color in an urn will mean that we draw a ball from the urn at random, 
and that you will receive a payoff of  1 if the drawn ball is the color on which you bet 
and  0 otherwise. We ask four independent questions, each of which offers two alter-
natives. Which do you prefer to bet on: (i) red or black in the uncertain urn? (ii) red 
or black in the risky urn? (iii) red in the uncertain urn or in the risky urn? (iv) black 
in the uncertain urn or in the risky urn?
If you are indifferent between red and black in questions (i) and (ii), and you 
strictly prefer the risky urn to the uncertain urn in questions (iii) and (iv), then your 
preferences are said to be uncertainty-averse. Many experimental studies have con-
firmed such uncertainty-averse preferences in lab experiments.
Is it reasonable for many people to strictly prefer the risky urn to the uncertain 
urn? According to Raiffa (1961), it may not be. By tossing a fair coin, you can 
eliminate the effects of uncertainty; you can obtain the fifty-fifty lottery between  1 
and  0 for each ball color drawn from the uncertain urn. For example, suppose that 
you bet on red if heads appears and you bet on black if tails appears. Then what you 
obtain is the fifty-fifty lottery between  1 and  0 for each ball color drawn from the 
uncertain urn. This is exactly what you obtain by betting on a color in the risky urn. 
Hence, there is no reason to strictly prefer the risky urn to the uncertain urn. This is 
the essence of Raiffa’s (1961) critique of uncertainty-averse preferences.
Raiffa’s (1961) critique has been widely accepted in the field. However, we claim 
that there are three important problems with his argument. The first problem is that 
Raiffa’s (1961) argument presupposes that you believe that the coin toss eliminates 
the effects of uncertainty. To see this, remember that Raiffa (1961) evaluates the 
coin toss for each ball color drawn from the uncertain urn, as shown by the left tree 
of Figure 1. However, there is another, equally natural way of evaluating the coin 
toss: evaluate the coin toss for each realization of the coin toss (i.e., heads or tails), 
as shown by the right tree of Figure 1.
According to this latter evaluation, you have to face uncertainty again, no matter 
which side of the coin appears. The coin toss therefore does not eliminate the effects 
of uncertainty. Indeed, this latter view of randomization would make more sense if 
1 Note that a red (black) ball drawn from Urn I is an uncertain event, while a red (black) ball drawn from Urn 
II is a risky event. 
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you think that a color of the drawn ball is realized after you toss the coin. These two 
ways of evaluating the coin toss (i.e., evaluating it for each ball color drawn from the 
uncertain urn or evaluating it for each realization of the coin toss) reflect whether or 
not you believe that the coin toss eliminates the effects of uncertainty. Both beliefs 
are legitimate, and which one is correct depends on you.
The second problem with Raiffa’s (1961) critique concerns the size of the choice 
set. Ellsberg (1961, p. 651, footnote 7) identifies this problem by saying: “Note that 
in no case are you invited to choose both a color and an urn freely; nor are you given 
any indication beforehand as to the full set of gambles that will be offered.” In the 
four questions, when you are asked your preference between the uncertain urn and 
the risky urn (namely, in questions (iii) and (iv)), your choice of a color is predeter-
mined so that you cannot randomize between betting on red and betting on black.
The third problem is that Raiffa (1961) has assumed that you can commit to the 
result of his randomization. To see this point, assume that you slightly prefer betting 
on red to betting on black. If the coin toss determines betting on black, then you 
might not be able to commit to the result of the coin toss.2
II. Preview of Results
Given the discussion above, a natural question to ask is: for what sort of prefer-
ences does a randomization eliminate the effects of uncertainty? To study this ques-
tion, we consider a set  S of states and an agent facing uncertainty about which state 
s ∈ S is realized. For example, in Ellsberg’s (1961) experiment,  S consists of the 
possible ball color drawn from the uncertain urn (i.e.,  S = {Red, Black} ).
2 I am very grateful to the referee who pointed out this important issue. 
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Figure 1. Two Ways to Evaluate the Coin Toss
Note: The coin toss eliminates the effects of uncertainty (left); does not eliminate the effects of 
uncertainty (right).
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We axiomatize the agent’s preferences over sets of payoff (utilities) profiles 
(across the states). We have in mind an agent facing a two-stage decision problem. 
The agent chooses a set in stage 1 and subsequently selects a payoff profile from 
that set in stage 2, maybe by randomization (such as tossing a coin). We do not use 
the agent’s random choice as a primitive because it may not be observable: he may 
randomize his choices in his mind without using observable randomization devices. 
Consequently, we do not explicitly model a process of random choice. Instead, we 
leave the agent’s random choice (and his commitment to his random choice) to 
be part of the interpretation of his utility function. Therefore, the third problem of 
Raiffa’s (1961) critique is moot in our model.
We axiomatize a utility function that identifies the agent’s subjective belief that 
his randomization eliminates the effects of uncertainty. We call the utility represen-
tation a random uncertainty-averse (RUA) representation. An RUA representation 
is characterized by a pair  (δ, C) of  δ ∈ [0, 1] and  C ⊂ Δ(S) . The utility of a set  A 
of payoff profiles is
(1)  U(A) =  max ρ∈Δ(A) 
  [δ u (  ∑ f∈A ρ( f ) f ) + (1 − δ)  ∑ f∈A ρ( f )u( f )] , 
where  u( f ) =  min p∈C    ∑ s∈S p(s)f(s) , and  Δ(A) is the set of probability distribu-
tions over payoff profiles in  A .
The function  u captures uncertainty aversion and corresponds to the maxmin 
expected utility function proposed by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). The parameter 
δ ∈ [0, 1] captures the agent’s subjective belief that his randomization  ρ eliminates 
the effects of uncertainty. Moreover, the maximizer  ρ over  Δ(A) captures the agent’s 
optimal random choice over  A . In an online Appendix, we present an axiomatization 
of an extended representation, in which  u is a variational utility function proposed 
by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and Rustichini (2006).
To understand these interpretations of  δ and  ρ , note that in the objective func-
tion, the first term,  u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ ρ( f ) f ) , is the utility when the randomization  ρ elim-
inates the effects of uncertainty because  ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f ) f denotes a state-wise mixture 
of  payoff profiles with respect to  ρ . For example, in the first term, Raiffa’s (1961) 
coin toss is evaluated as the constant payoff profile  1 _2(1, 0) +  1 _2(0, 1) ≡  ( 1 _2,  1 _2) , 
where the payoff profiles  (1, 0) and  (0, 1) correspond to betting on red and black, 
 respectively, in the uncertain urn.
On the other hand, the second term,  ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )u( f ) , is the utility when the 
 randomization  ρ does not eliminate the effects of uncertainty. In this case, the agent 
evaluates each payoff profile separately and then calculates the expected value with 
respect to  ρ . For example, in the second term, the utility of the coin toss is the 
expected utility of  1 _2 u(1, 0) +  1 _2 u(0, 1) .
Therefore, the parameter  δ captures the agent’s subjective belief that his random-
ization  ρ eliminates the effects of uncertainty. In this way, we address the first prob-
lem with Raiffa’s (1961) critique, namely that Raiffa (1961) presupposes that the 
agent believes that his randomization eliminates the effects of uncertainty. (In other 
words, Raiffa 1961 presupposes  δ = 1 .) In our model, the weighted sum of the two 
terms,  δu ( ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f ) f ) + (1 − δ) ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )u( f ) , is the agent’s expected utility 
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obtained by his randomization  ρ . Therefore, the maximizer  ρ over  Δ(A)  captures 
the agent’s optimal random choice over  A . Note that we obtain the optimal random 
choice endogenously, in the sense that our primitive does not include a choice of 
randomization.
We apply our result to Ellsberg’s (1961) experiment to address the second prob-
lem with Raiffa’s (1961) critique, namely that whether an agent can randomize his 
choices or not depends on how large his choice set is. We consider an agent whose 
preferences admit an RUA representation and who faces the two urns described in 
Section I. Then, we study how the size of the agent’s choice set affects his observ-
able attitude toward uncertainty. We show that the agent’s uncertainty premium 
depends on who determines the ball color drawn from the uncertain urn on which 
he bets. The uncertain premium is lower when the agent determines it than when 
the experimenter predetermines it. Moreover, we also show that when the agent 
determines the ball color, his uncertainty premium decreases as  δ increases. In fact, 
the agent’s uncertainty premium becomes zero when  δ = 1 , even when he is uncer-
tainty-averse. See Section V.
We present comparative statics on  δ . We show that both a preference for random-
ization and a preference for flexibility (i.e., preference for a larger set) are captured 
in a natural way by  δ . See Section IV. All proofs are in Section VI.
Finally, let us now discuss the related literature. Our paper is related to papers on 
subjective state space, such as the work of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) 
and Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007). Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007) point 
out that an agent can eliminate the effects of uncertainty by randomizing his choice; 
they then axiomatize two models that are similar to the two special cases of RUA 
representations with  δ = 1 and  δ = 0 . Our paper, however, is different from both 
papers in its motivations and primitives. The main purpose of Dekel, Lipman, 
and Rustichini (2001) and Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007) is to obtain a 
state space endogenously, a space which has often been assumed as a primitive 
(e.g., in Savage 1954 and Anscombe and Aumann 1963 as well as in our paper). 
Consequently, the primitive preferences of Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) 
and Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007) are defined on sets of payoffs (i.e., lotter-
ies), while our primitive preferences are defined on sets of payoff profiles across 
the state space.
Our paper is also related to recent axiomatic literature on random choice, such 
as Battigalli et al. (2013), Gul and Pesendorfer (2006), and Manzini and Mariotti 
(2014). Their primitives and motivations are also different from ours. They all use 
random choice functions as primitives. Moreover, only Battigalli et al. (2013) study 
uncertainty-averse agents. The main purpose of Battigalli et al. (2013), however, is 
different from ours in that they present a new framework for studying random choice 
under uncertainty, while maintaining the mathematical convenience of Anscombe 
and Aumann’s (1963) framework.
In Saito (2013), we have also studied a preference for randomization. There, we 
focus on other-regarding behaviors in a social context, such as when two agents toss 
a coin to decide who gets an indivisible good. In contrast to the present paper, the 
primitive preferences in that paper are defined on randomizations over payoff pro-
files (across the agents). This difference in primitives arises from the fact that ran-
domizations would be observable in a social context. For example, the two agents 
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would use observable randomization devices to decide who gets the indivisible 
good. Because of the difference in primitives, our proof here is completely different 
from the proof in Saito (2013).
There is recent research on a preference for randomization under uncertainty, 
in which primitive preferences are defined on randomizations over payoff profiles 
(across the state space). Eichberger, Grant, and Kelsey (2014) show that a dynami-
cally consistent agent has no preference for randomization. Kuzmics (2013) shows 
that if an agent can randomize his choice in his mind, he can commit to his random-
ization, and if he believes that his randomization eliminates the effects of uncer-
tainty, then he behaves as if uncertainty-neutral.
III. Axioms
We denote the set of payoffs (i.e., von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities) by  𝒰 . 
We assume that  𝒰 is a nonempty, compact, and convex subset of real numbers.3 We 
also assume that  𝒰 is not a singleton.4 We denote the set of real numbers by  ℝ and 
the set of nonnegative real numbers by  ℝ + . Let  S = {1,  … , n} be the set of states. 
A payoff profile  f = ( f (1),  .  .  . , f (n)) ∈  𝒰 S is called an act. We denote the set  𝒰 S 
of acts by  ℱ . Let  𝒜 be the set of all nonempty compact subsets of  ℱ . A probability 
distribution  ρ over acts with finite support is called a randomization. For any set 
A ∈ 𝒜 , we denote by  Δ(A) the set of randomizations over acts in  A .
The primitive of our model is a binary relation  ≿ on  𝒜 , which describes the 
agent’s choice of sets.5 Note that this domain of  ≿ does not include randomizations 
(i.e.,  Δ(ℱ) ⊄ 𝒜 ). In this sense, we do not assume that the agent’s choices over 
randomizations are observable.
An act  f is called a constant act if  f(s) = f( s ′ ) for all  s,  s ′ ∈ S . For an act  f , a 
payoff  x ∈ 𝒰 is called the certainty equivalent of  f , if  f ∼ (x,  … , x) . We denote the 
certainty equivalent of  f by  x( f ) .
Payoffs are denoted by  x ,  y ∈ 𝒰 . Sets of acts are denoted by  A, B ∈ 𝒜 . Acts 
are denoted by  f ,  g ,  h ∈ ℱ . Randomizations are denoted by  ρ, μ ∈ Δ(ℱ) . If  ρ is a 
randomization that yields act  f i with probability  ρ i ∈ [0, 1] for each  i ∈ {1,  … , m} , 
then we write  ρ =  ρ 1  f 1 ⊕  ⋯ ⊕  ρ m  f m .
We define state-wise mixtures of acts and sets as follows:
DEFINITION 1: For all  α ∈ [0, 1] and  f, g ∈ ℱ ,  αf + (1 − α)g is an act such 
that  (αf + (1 − α)g)(s) = α f  (s) + (1 − α)g(s) ∈ 𝒰 for each  s ∈ S .
For any  f 1 ,  … ,  f n ∈ ℱ and any  α 1 ,  … ,  α n ∈ [0, 1] such that  ∑ i=1 n  α i = 1 , we 
denote  α 1  f 1 +  ⋯ +  α n  f n by  ∑ i=1 n  α i  f i . In the following, by mixing acts, we 
mean making a state-wise mixture among the acts. Note that the state-wise mixture 
of acts is not a (nondegenerate) randomization.
3 With a set  Z of outcomes, we can use the standard domain  Δ(Z) instead of  𝒰 without any major changes in 
results. 
4 I am very grateful to the referee who suggested this assumption. 
5 As usual,  ≻ and  ∼ denote the asymmetric and symmetric parts of  ≿ , respectively. 
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DEFINITION 2: For all  α ∈ [0, 1] and  A, B ∈ 𝒜 ,  α A + (1 − α)B 
= {αf + (1 − α)g | f ∈ A and g ∈ B} .
The first five axioms are based on the axioms in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Axiom (Weak Order):  ≿ is complete and transitive.
Axiom (Continuity): For any  f, g ∈ ℱ and  A ∈ 𝒜 , if  { f } ≻ A ≻ {g} then 
α{ f } + (1 − α)A ≻ A ≻ β {g} + (1 − β)A for some  α and  β in  (0, 1) .
Axiom (Monotonicity): For any  f, g ∈ ℱ , if  f(s) ≥ g(s) for all  s ∈ S then 
{ f }  ≿  {g} . Moreover, if  f (s) > g(s) for all  s ∈ S then  { f } ≻ {g} .
Since  𝒰 is neither empty nor singleton, there exist  x, y ∈ 𝒰 such that  x > y . 
Hence, the monotonicity axiom implies that  (x,  … , x) ≻ (y,  … , y) . So,  ≻ is 
nondegenerate.
The next and last axiom captures the agent’s uncertainty aversion. To motivate 
the axiom, consider the two urns in Section I. Hence, the state space consists of the 
possible ball color drawn from the uncertain urn (i.e.,  S = {Red, Black} ). The acts 
f Red ≡ (1, 0) and  f Black ≡ (0, 1) correspond to betting on red and black, respec-
tively, in the uncertain urn. The act  ( 1 _2,  1 _2) corresponds to betting on a color in the 
risky urn; this is because by doing so, the agent can obtain the expected payoff of 
 1 _2 independent of a realization of a state. The uncertainty-averse agent prefers 
 ( 1 _2,  1 _2) ≡  1 _2  f Red +  1 _2  f Black to  f Red and  f Black , if he is indifferent between  f Red and 
f Black . Thus, such an uncertainty-averse agent would prefer to mix two equally 
desirable acts, because mixing nonconstant acts can make the mixed payoff profile 
smoother.
Axiom (Uncertainty Aversion): For any  f, g ∈ ℱ , if  { f } ∼ {g} then 
 { 1 _2 f +  1 _2 g} ≿ { f } .
On the other hand, mixing an act with a constant act might not make the mixed 
payoff profile smoother. Hence, such a mixture does not reverse the agent’s pref-
erence between two sets. This observation motivates the following axiom, which 
is a natural extension of Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) certainty independence 
axiom.6
Axiom (Certainty Set Independence): For any  x ∈ 𝒰 ,  A, B ∈ 𝒜 , and  α ∈ [0, 1] ,
  A ≿ B ⇔ α A + (1 − α){(x,  .  .  . , x)} ≿  αB + (1 − α){(x,  .  .  . , x)} . 
6 Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) certainty independence axiom is as follows:  f  ≿  g ⇔ αf + (1 − α) 
× (x,  .  .  . , x) ≿  α g + (1 − α)(x,  .  .  . , x) . 
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The next two axioms are new. The first of these, certainty strategic rationality, is 
significantly weaker than Kreps’s (1979) strategic rationality axiom. Kreps (1979) 
requires that if  A ≿  B , then  A ∼ A ∪ B . The uncertainty-averse agent could violate 
this axiom. Even if the agent has the option to choose from a set  A and he prefers  A 
to another set  B , he might have a strict preference for the additional option to choose 
from  B so that he could randomize acts in  A as well as acts in  B . However, when  A 
consists of a constant act (i.e.,  A = {(x,  … , x)} ), the agent might not have the strict 
preference for the additional option because a randomization with the constant act 
would not make the payoff profile smoother. This suggests the following weaker 
axiom.
Axiom (Certainty Strategic Rationality): For any  f, g ∈ ℱ and  x ∈ 𝒰 ,
  {(x,  .  .  . , x)} ≿  {  f, g} ⇒ {(x,  .  .  . , x)} ∼ {(x,  .  .  . , x),  f, g} . 
The last axiom is related to Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini’s (2001) indiffer-
ence to randomization axiom. A natural extension of their axiom to our domain 
is:  A ∼ co(A) , where  co(A) denotes the convex hull with respect to the state-wise 
mixtures  (i.e., co(A) =  { ∑ i=1 n  α i  f i |   f 1 ,  … ,   f n ∈ ℱ and  α 1 ,  … ,  α n ∈ [0, 1] such 
that  ∑ i=1 n  α i = 1} ) .7
Whether the agent satisfies this indifference to randomization axiom depends 
on whether he believes that his randomization eliminates the effects of uncer-
tainty. To see this, consider the two urns in Section I again. Remember that the acts 
f Red ≡ (1, 0) and  f Black ≡ (0, 1) correspond to betting on red and black, respec-
tively, in the uncertain urn; and that the act  ( 1 _2,  1 _2) corresponds to betting on a color 
in the risky urn.
Suppose that the agent can determine the ball color drawn from the uncer-
tain urn on which he bets; then his choice set is  {  f Red ,  f Black } . Note that 
 co ( {  f Red ,  f Black } ) ≡ {(p, 1 − p) | p ∈ [0, 1]} , and the convex hull contains the 
act  ( 1 _2,  1 _2) . Therefore, the uncertainty-averse agent would strictly prefer 
 co ( {  f Red ,  f Black } )  to  {   f Red ,  f Black } in order to choose  ( 1 _2,  1 _2) , unless he believes 
what Raiffa (1961) claims, namely that his coin toss eliminates the effects of uncer-
tainty completely.
We propose a new axiom, dominance, which the agent can satisfy independent of 
his belief. The dominance axiom states that the agent should prefer a set  A to another 
set  B , if  A provides better randomization than  B , regardless of whether he believes 
that his randomization eliminates the effects of uncertainty.
To define the dominance axiom, we formalize two ways to evaluate a randomiza-
tion depending on the agent’s belief about the randomization. To illustrate the two 
ways, consider the two urns in Section I again and note that the coin toss is described 
as  1 _2  f Red ⊕  1 _2  f Black ≡  1 _2(1, 0) ⊕  1 _2(0, 1) . If the agent believes—as Raiffa (1961) 
7 Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001, p. 904) have proposed this axiom for preferences over sets of lotteries 
but not for preferences over sets of acts. 
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claims—that the coin toss eliminates the effects of uncertainty, then he would evalu-
ate the randomization as the state-wise mixture  1 _2(1, 0) +  1 _2(0, 1) ≡  ( 1 _2,  1 _2) .
On the other hand, if the agent thinks that the coin toss does not eliminate the 
effects of uncertainty, then he should be indifferent to reducing each act (namely 
(1, 0) and  (0, 1) ) to its certainty equivalent (namely  x(1, 0) and  x(0, 1)) . Because 
mixtures among constant acts do not affect uncertainty. Hence, the value of the 
coin toss should be equal to the expected value  1 _2 x(1, 0) +  1 _2 x(0, 1) of the certainty 
equivalents.8 These observations suggest the following two ways to compare ran-
domizations that depend on the agent’s belief:
DEFINITION 3: For all  ρ, μ ∈ Δ(ℱ) such that  ρ =  ρ 1 f  1 ⊕  ⋯ ⊕  ρ m f  m , 
 μ =  μ 1 g 1 ⊕  ⋯ ⊕  μ k  g k ,  ρ dominates  μ if
 (i)  x( ρ 1 f  1 +  ⋯ +  ρ m f  m ) ≥ x( μ 1 g 1 +  ⋯ +  μ k  g k ) ; and
 (ii)  ρ 1  x( f  1 ) +  ⋯ +  ρ m x( f  m ) ≥  μ 1 x( g 1 ) +  ⋯ +  μ k x( g k ) .
Definition 3 (i) captures the comparison of randomizations  ρ and  μ when the 
agent believes that the randomizations eliminate the effects of uncertainty. Definition 
3 (ii) captures the comparison when the agent believes that the randomizations do 
not eliminate those effects. Hence, if  ρ dominates  μ , then the agent should prefer  ρ 
to  μ independent of his belief about his randomizations.
Axiom (Dominance): For any  A, B ∈ 𝒜 , if for all  μ ∈ Δ(B) , there exists 
ρ ∈ Δ(A) such that  ρ dominates  μ , then  A ≿  B .
To summarize, the dominance axiom means that the agent should prefer a set  A to 
another set  B , if for any randomization  μ over  B , there exists a better randomization 
8 Note that under the first three axioms, there exists a unique certainty equivalent  x( f ) for any act  f ∈ ℱ . 
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and Does Not (Right) Eliminate the Effects of Uncertainty
Note: x( f ) denotes the certainty equivalent of act f.
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ρ over  A , regardless of whether he believes that his randomizations eliminate the 
effects of uncertainty.
THEOREM 1:  ≿ satisfies Weak Order, Continuity, Monotonicity, Uncertainty 
Aversion, Certainty Set Independence, Certainty Strategic Rationality, and 
Dominance if and only if there exists a pair  (δ, C) of  δ ∈ [0, 1] and  C ⊂ Δ(S) such 
that  ≿ is represented by a function  U : 𝒜 → ℝ defined by
(2)  U(A) =  max ρ∈Δ(A) 
  [δ u (  ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f ) f ) + (1 − δ)  ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )u( f )] , 
where  u( f ) =  min p∈C    ∑ s∈S p(s) f (s) and  C is compact and convex.9
We call  ≿ an RUA preference relation if  ≿ satisfies all the axioms in Theorem 1. 
In the online Appendix, we present an axiomatization of an extended representation, 
in which  u is a variational utility function proposed by Maccheroni, Marinacci, and 
Rustichini (2006).
For an RUA preference relation, both parameters  δ and  C are unique whenever 
the agent is not an expected utility maximizer.
REMARK 1: Suppose that two RUA representations with  (δ, C) and  ( δ ′ ,  C ′ ) repre-
sent the same  ≿ . Then (i)  C =  C ′ , and (ii) if  C is not a singleton, then  δ =  δ ′ .
In this remark, (i) means that  C is uniquely pinned down for the agent. (ii) means 
that  δ is also uniquely pinned down when the agent is not an expected utility max-
imizer. When the agent is an expected utility maximizer (i.e., when  C = { p} ), 
then the first term and the second term become equal (i.e.,  u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ ρ( f ) f ) =  ∑ s∈S p(s)  ∑ f ∈ℱ ρ( f ) f (s) =  ∑ f ∈ℱ ρ( f )u( f )) . Therefore,  δ becomes irrele-
vant to the agent’s utility. In this sense, the nonuniqueness of  δ in the case of an 
expected utility maximizer is unavoidable but not significant.
IV. Characterizations of  δ 
In this section, we study how the key parameter  δ describes the agent’s prefer-
ences. First, we discuss the implication of the two special cases of the RUA repre-
sentations in which  δ = 1 and  δ = 0 . After that, we present comparative statics 
on  δ .
The two special cases in which  δ = 1 and  δ = 0 imply that the agent believes 
that his randomization can eliminate the effects of uncertainty completely and that 
his randomization cannot eliminate those effects at all, respectively. Both implica-
tions seem rather extreme. This would suggest that most people would exhibit the 
generic case in which  δ ∈ (0, 1) . Indeed, the next proposition shows that the two 
special cases are characterized by rather strong axioms, namely the  indifference 
9 Remember that values of acts are utils. Hence, for all  x ∈ 𝒰 ,  U({(x,  … , x)}) = u(x,  … , x) = x . 
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to randomization axiom (i.e.,  A ∼ co(A) ) and the strategic rationality axiom 
(i.e.,  A ≿  B ⇒ A ∼ A ∪ B ), respectively.
PROPOSITION 1: Suppose that  ≿ is represented by an RUA representation with 
(δ, C) . 
 (i)  ≿ satisfies the indifference to randomization axiom if and only if  δ = 1 .
 (ii)  ≿ satisfies the strategic rationality axiom if and only if  δ = 0 .
In what follows, we present comparative statics on  δ . We show that both a pref-
erence for flexibility (i.e., a preference for a larger choice set) and a preference for 
randomization are captured by  δ . We say that agent 1 has a stronger preference for 
flexibility than agent 2 if agent 1 prefers a set of acts to an act in the set whenever 
agent 2 also prefers that set to that act. Formally,
DEFINITION 4:  ≿ 1 is said to exhibit a stronger preference for flexibility than  ≿ 2 if, 
for every  A ∈ 𝒜 and  f ∈ A ,
  A  ≿ 2 {  f } ⇒ A  ≿ 1 { f  } . 
Next, we formalize a comparative attitude across agents toward randomization. 
Consider an agent whose preference relation  ≿ admits an RUA representation with 
(δ, C) . Then, we define  w(ρ) to be the agent’s expected utility of randomization  ρ 
when  ρ eliminates the effects of uncertainty with probability  δ . Formally, for any 
ρ ∈ Δ(ℱ) , define  w(ρ) = δu ( ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )f ) + (1 − δ) ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )u( f ) , where 
u( f ) =  min p∈C    ∑ s∈S p(s) f(s) .
DEFINITION 5: For an RUA preference relation  ≿ , we denote by  Δ ≿ (A) the set of 
maximizers of  w( · ) over  Δ(A) (i.e.,  Δ ≿ (A) ≡ arg  max ρ∈Δ(A)   w(ρ) ).
Note that Theorem 1 shows that  max ρ∈Δ(A)   w(ρ) represents  ≿ . Hence, Theorem 1 
guarantees that  Δ ≿ (A) is nonempty.10 Note also that  ( Δ ≿ (A)) \  A ≠  ∅ means that a 
nondegenerate randomization is optimal. In other words, the agent has an incentive 
to randomize his choice. We say that agent  1 has a stronger preference for random-
ization than agent  2 if agent  1 has an incentive to randomize his choice whenever 
agent  2 has such an incentive. Formally,
DEFINITION 6: For any RUA preference relations  ≿ 1 and  ≿ 2 ,  ≿ 1 is said to exhibit 
a stronger preference for randomization than  ≿ 2 if for any  A ∈ 𝒜 ,
  ( Δ  ≿ 2  (A)) \  A ≠  ∅ ⇒ ( Δ  ≿ 1  (A)) \  A ≠  ∅. 
10 We can directly prove that  Δ ≿ (A) ≠  ∅ , as follows. Since  S is finite and  A is compact,  Δ(A) is compact. ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )u( f ) is continuous in  ρ . By Berge’s maximum theorem,  u( ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f ) f ) is also continuous in  ρ (see 
footnote 14 for the detailed argument). Hence,  w(ρ) is continuous in  ρ . Therefore, Weierstrass’s theorem shows that 
Δ ≿ (A) ≡ arg  max ρ∈Δ(A)   w(ρ) ≠  ∅ . 
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PROPOSITION 2: Suppose  ≿ i is represented by an RUA representation with 
 ( δ i ,  C i ) for each  i ∈ {1, 2} and  C 1 =  C 2 , where  C 1 is not a singleton. Then, the 
following conditions are equivalent:
 (i)  ≿ 1 exhibits a stronger preference for flexibility than  ≿ 2 ; 
 (ii)  δ 1 ≥  δ 2 ; and
  (iii)  ≿ 1 exhibits a stronger preference for randomization than  ≿ 2 .
The result shows that in RUA preference relations, a stronger preference for 
randomization is equivalent to a stronger preference for flexibility. Moreover, both 
comparative attitudes are captured by a larger  δ .
V. Application
In this section, we apply our result to Ellsberg’s (1961) experiment: we consider 
an agent whose preference relation admits an RUA representation. Then, we study 
how the size of the agent’s choice set affects his observable attitude toward uncer-
tainty, namely his uncertainty premium.
Remember that an agent’s uncertainty premium is the premium for betting on 
the ball color drawn from the risky urn: a premium whose magnitude is such as to 
make him indifferent between (i) betting on the ball color drawn from the risky urn 
and (ii) betting on the ball color drawn from the uncertain urn. Remember also that 
the two acts  f Red ≡ (1, 0) and  f Black ≡ (0, 1) correspond to betting on red and black, 
respectively, in the uncertain urn. The act  ( 1 _2,  1 _2) corresponds to betting on a color 
in the risky urn.
Our framework allows us to define the agent’s uncertainty premiums depending 
on who determines the ball color drawn from the uncertain urn on which the agent 
bets. When the agent determines it, the uncertainty premium  r RedBlack is defined as 
follows:  { ( 1 _2 −  r RedBlack ,  1 _2 −  r RedBlack ) } ∼  { f Red ,  f Black } . Note that, in the left set, 
the agent can obtain  1 _2 by paying the premium  r 
RedBlack ; in the right set, the agent can 
choose a color freely to bet on.
On the other hand, when the experimenter predetermines the color (e.g., red) 
on which the agent bets, the uncertainty premium  r Red is defined as follows: 
 { ( 1 _2 −  r Red ,  1 _2 −  r Red ) } ∼  { f Red } . We define  r Black in the same way 
 (i.e.,  { ( 1 _2 −  r Black ,  1 _2 −  r Black ) } ∼  { f Black } ) .
PROPOSITION 3: Suppose that  { f Red } ∼  {  f Black } , and C is not a singleton. Then, 
min { r Red ,  r Black } >  r RedBlack if and only if  δ > 0.
This proposition shows that a smaller choice set increases the agent’s uncertainty 
premium as long as δ > 0. In other words, the agent behaves as if he were more 
uncertainty-averse when his choice set is smaller.
In fact, in many experimental studies, an agent is allowed to determine the 
ball color drawn from the uncertain urn on which he bets. In accordance with 
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this  convention, we also use   r RedBlack  as the agent’s uncertainty premium, rather 
than  r Red or  r Black . Consequently, we say that the agent is observationally uncer-
tainty-averse if   r RedBlack > 0 and that he is observationally uncertainty-neutral if 
r RedBlack = 0. We can calculate   r RedBlack  explicitly as follows:
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that  { f Red } ∼  { f Black } . Then,
  r RedBlack =  (1 − δ) | C |__________ 
2
 ,
where | C | =  max p∈C   p(Red) −  mi n p∈C p(Red). Hence, the agent is observationally 
uncertainty-averse if and only if δ < 1 and | C | > 0.
This proposition means that the agent’s uncertainty premium is determined not 
only by his set C of priors but also by his subjective belief (i.e., δ) that his random-
ization eliminates the effects of uncertainty. The uncertainty premium is decreasing 
in δ. Indeed, even if the agent does not have a unique prior (i.e., | C | > 0), he can be 
observationally uncertainty-neutral (i.e.,  r RedBlack = 0) when δ = 1.
Given Proposition 4, we can characterize the comparative attitudes across agents. 
We say that  ≿ 1 is observationally more uncertainty-averse than  ≿ 2 if  r 1 RedBlack ≥  r 2 RedBlack , where  r i RedBlack  is the uncertainty premium for each agent i ∈ {1, 2}.
COROLLARY 1: Suppose that  ≿ i is represented by an RUA representation with 
( δ i ,  C i ) and  { f Red }  ∼ i  { f Black } for each i ∈ {1, 2}. Then,  ≿ 1 is observationally more 
 uncertainty-averse than  ≿ 2 if and only if (1 −  δ 1 ) | C1 | ≥ (1 −  δ 2 ) | C2 |.
This proposition implies that even when agent 1 has a smaller set of priors than 
agent 2 (i.e.,  C 1 ⊂  C 2 ), agent 1 could be observationally more uncertainty-averse 
than agent 2 if δ1 < δ2.
VI. Proofs
First, we present the sketch for the proof of Theorem 1. Then, we show the proofs 
of Theorem 1 and Remark 1. Finally, we present the proofs of Propositions 1– 4.
A. Sketch of Proof
In this section, we sketch the proof of sufficiency in Theorem 1. The main dif-
ficulty in the proof arises from the fact that we do not assume the indifference to 
randomization axiom:  A ∼ co(A) . This axiom has been used by many authors such 
as Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) and Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007).11 
11 Dekel, Lipman, and Rustichini (2001) and Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007) impose the indifference 
to randomization axiom on preferences over sets of lotteries. Epstein, Marinacci, and Seo (2007) propose two 
 representations. For one representation, they impose the indifference to randomization axiom. For the other repre-
sentation, they do not impose the axiom. Instead, they use richer primitives, that is, preferences over (the second 
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Since we do not assume this axiom, we cannot focus on convex sets without loss 
of generality. We overcome this difficulty by investigating sets in a utility space. It 
turns out that, in the utility space, we can focus on convex sets without loss of gen-
erality because of the quasi-concavity of uncertainty-averse preferences.
The outline of the sketch is as follows. First, we focus on sets that contain two 
indifferent acts (i.e.,  {  f, g} such that  f ∼ g ). Then, we explain how to obtain the 
desired representation on these particular domains. Finally, we explain how to 
extend the desired representation into the whole domain.
By a standard argument, there exists a utility function U : 𝒜 → ℝ such that  U 
has Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) maxmin expected utility representation on  ℱ . 
Consider  { f, g} such that  f ∼ g . Define
(3)  δ({ f, g}) =  U({ f, g}) − U( f )   __________________________  max α∈[0, 1]   U(αf + (1 − α)g) − U( f ) . 
By Certainty Set Independence, it can be shown that  δ does not depend on  f and 
g . (See Lemma 6 for the proof.) So, we can define  δ = δ({ f, g}) . By rewrit-
ing (3), we obtain  U({ f, g}) =  max α∈[0, 1]   δU(αf + (1 − α)g) + (1 − δ)U( f ) =  max α∈[0, 1]   δU(αf + (1 − α)g) + (1 − δ)(αU( f ) + (1 − α)U(g)) . The last 
equality holds because  U( f ) = U(g) . Define
(4)  ℒ = {{ f, g} |  f ∼ g and αf + (1 − α)g ≻ f for some α ∈ [0, 1]} . 
Note that  δ is well defined on  ℒ and that we have obtained the desired representa-
tion on  ℒ .
Next, we obtain the representation on an arbitrary set  A ∈ 𝒜 . For this aim, we 
consider the set that consists of the utilities of randomizations on  A .12 For any ran-
domization  ρ , we define  v 1 (ρ) as the utility of  ρ when  ρ eliminates the effects of 
uncertainty; and  v 2 (ρ) as the utility of  ρ when  ρ does not eliminate those effects. 
Formally,  v 1 (ρ) = U( ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f ) f ) ; and  v 2 (ρ) =  ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )U( f ) . For any set 
A ∈ 𝒜 , define
(5)  A ∗ = {( v 1 ,  v 2 ) ∈  ℝ 2 |  v 2 =  v 2 (ρ) and  v 2 (ρ) ≤  v 1 ≤  v 1 (ρ) for some ρ ∈ Δ(A)} . 
By Dominance, we can show that if  A ∗ =  B ∗ , then  U(A) = U(B) . Therefore, 
without loss of generality, we can focus on this alternative domain  𝒜 ∗ . (See Lemma 7 
for a formal proof.)
This alternative domain has useful properties. It can be shown that 
 A ∗ = co({( v 1 (ρ),  v 2 (ρ)) ∈  ℝ 2 | ρ ∈ Δ(A)}) because of the concavity of  U on  ℱ . 
Moreover, Jensen’s inequality implies that  v 1 ≥  v 2 for all  ( v 1 ,  v 2 ) ∈  A ∗ . Hence,  A ∗ 
is a convex set, as described in Figure 3.
stage) lotteries over sets of (the first stage) lotteries. They then assume the independence axiom with respect to the 
second stage lotteries. 
12 For technical simplicity,  A ∗ consists not only of the utilities of randomizations on  A but also of the dominated 
utilities. 
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In particular, if  A ∈ ℒ (i.e.,  A = { f, g} for some  f, g ∈ ℱ such that 
 f ∼ g ), then  A ∗ becomes a line segment spanned by  (U( f ), U( f )) and 
 ( max α∈[0, 1]   U(αf + (1 − α)g), U( f )) . Hence, the parameter  δ can be 
described as the slope of the line connecting  (U({ f, g}), U({ f, g})) and 
 ( max α∈[0, 1]   U(αf + (1 − α)g), U( f )) , as shown in Figure 4. Remember that we 
have already obtained the desired  representation on  ℒ : for any  A ∈ ℒ ,  U(A) 
=  max ρ∈Δ(A)    δU( ∑ f∈ℱ  ρ( f ) f ) + (1 − δ) ∑ f∈ℱ  ρ( f )U( f ) = ma x v∈ A ∗  δ v 1 + (1 − δ) v 2 .
Finally, we extend the representation to an arbitrary  A ∈ 𝒜 . For all 
 ( v 1 ,  v 2 ) ∈  ℝ 2 , define  V( v 1 ,  v 2 ) = δ v 1 + (1 − δ) v 2 . Let  U ∗ be the maximum of 
V on  A ∗ and  v ∗ be its maximizer on  A ∗ . Let  B, C ∈ ℒ such that  B ∗ and  C ∗ are 
the two line segments respectively described in Figure 5.13 Note that  B ∗ is the 
line segment spanned by  ( v 2 ∗,  v 2 ∗) and  v ∗ . We denote by  w _ and  _ w the two points 
that span the line segment  C ∗ . Moreover, the slope of the line connecting  v ∗ and 
 ( U ∗ ,  U ∗ ) , and the slope of the line connecting  w _ and  ( U ∗ ,  U ∗ ) are the same, namely  δ . 
13 Existence of such sets will be proved in Lemma 9. 
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Therefore, by the representation on  ℒ ,  U(B) =  max v∈ B ∗    V( v 1 ,  v 2 ) =  U ∗ =  max v∈ C ∗    V( v 1 ,  v 2 ) = U(C) .
Define  D = C ∪ {( U ∗ ,  … ,  U ∗ )} . Since  U( U ∗ ,  … ,  U ∗ ) =  U ∗ , Certainty Strategic 
Rationality shows that  U(D) =  U ∗ . Moreover,  D ∗ = co( C ∗ ∪ {( U ∗ ,  U ∗ )}) , which 
is the triangle containing  A ∗ described in Figure 5. Since  B ∗ ⊂  A ∗ ⊂  D ∗ , we can 
show  U(B) ≤ U(A) ≤ U(D) by using Dominance. Since  U(B) =  U ∗ = U(D) , 
we obtain  U(A) =  U ∗ ≡  max v∈ A ∗    V( v 1 ,  v 2 ) =  max ρ∈Δ(A)   δU ( ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f ) f  ) + 
(1 − δ) ∑ f∈ℱ ρ( f )U( f ) , where the last equality holds by the definition of  v . (See 
Lemma 9 for a formal proof.)
B. Proof of Sufficiency in Theorem 1
In this section, we present the proof of sufficiency in Theorem 1. The proof con-
sists of nine lemmas. First, we present the outline of the proof with the statements 
of the lemmas. After that, we present the proofs of the lemmas. (We put the proofs 
of several lemmas in the online Appendix.) Based on one’s interest, one can read the 
outline only or the entire section.
We introduce the following notation. We denote a singleton set { f } by f. We de- 
note constant acts (x, … , x) and (y, … , y) by x and y when there is no danger of con-
fusion. For example, we denote αf   + (1 − α)(x, … , x) and α A + (1 − α)(x, … , x) 
by α f + (1 − α)x and α A + (1 − α)x, respectively.
Note that Certainty Set Independence implies Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) 
axiom: f   ≿ g ⇔ αf + (1 − α)x   ≿ αg + (1 − α)x for all f, g ∈ ℱ, x ∈ 𝒰, and 
α ∈ (0, 1). Hence, Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) theorem shows the next lemma. 
The proof is in the online Appendix.
LEMMA 1: There exists a nonempty, compact, and convex subset C of Δ(S) such 
that ≿ on ℱ is represented by u( f ) =  min p∈C  ∑ s∈S   p(s) f (s).
By Dominance and Continuity, for any A ∈ 𝒜, we can find f ∈ ℱ such that 
{ f } ~ A. Define U(A) = u( f ). So by Lemma 1, we can prove Lemma 2. The formal 
proof is in the online Appendix.
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(U*, U*)
(v
2
*, v
2
*)
δ
45°
ww
δ
Figure 5. Sets A*, B*, C*, and D*
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LEMMA 2: There exists a function U : 𝒜 → 𝒰 such that (i) U(A) ≥ U(B) ⇔ A ≿ B 
and (ii) U( f ) =  min p∈C  ∑ s∈S   p(s) f (s) for all f ∈ ℱ.
By Dominance and the concavity of U on ℱ, we obtain the next lemma.
LEMMA 3: (i) For all ρ ∈ Δ(ℱ), U ( ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f ) ≥  ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f )U( f ) ; and (ii) 
max ρ∈Δ(A) U ( ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f ) ≥ U(A) ≥  max ρ∈Δ(A)  ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f ) U( f ).
In the next lemma, by using Lemma 3 (ii), we can establish Theorem 1 when U 
has an expected utility representation on ℱ.
LEMMA 4: Suppose that U has an expected utility representation on ℱ. 
Then, for any δ ∈ [0, 1] and A ∈ 𝒜, U(A) =  max ρ∈Δ(A) δU  ( ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f ) + (1 − δ)  ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f ) U( f ).
In the following, we assume that U does not have an expected utility repre-
sentation on ℱ. Then, by a standard argument, there exist  f * ,  g * ∈ ℱ such that 
 1 _2   f 
* +  1 _2  g * ≻  f * ~  g * . (We, henceforth, fix these   f * and  g * .) Define ℒ by (4) in the 
sketch of proof. Note that {   f * ,  g * } ∈ ℒ.
For all { f, g} ∈ ℒ, define δ({ f, g}) by (3) in the sketch of proof. By the defi-
nition, ma x α∈[0, 1] U(α f + (1 − α)g) > U( f ), so the denominator of δ({ f, g}) 
is positive. Therefore, δ({ f, g}) is well defined. Moreover, by Lemma 3 (ii), 
ma x α∈[0, 1] U(α f + (1 − α)g) ≥ U({ f, g}) ≥ U( f ), so that δ({ f, g}) ∈ [0, 1].
Since U is a maxmin expected utility function on ℱ, U is constant linear (i.e., for any 
f ∈ ℱ, x ∈ 𝒰, and α ∈ [0, 1], we have U(α f + (1 − α)x) = αU( f ) + (1 − α)x). 
Mainly by using this property and Certainty Set Independence, we can prove the 
next lemma.
LEMMA 5: For all A ∈ 𝒜, α ∈ [0, 1], and x ∈ 𝒰, U(αA + (1 − α)x) = αU(A) + 
(1 − α)x.
By using Lemma 5, in the next lemma, we can show that δ is constant on ℒ, 
hence we obtain the desired representation on ℒ.
LEMMA 6:
There exists δ ∈ [0, 1] such that U({ f, g}) = ma x ρ∈Δ({ f, g}) δU ( ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f )f ) + (1 − δ) ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f )U( f ) for all { f, g} ∈ ℒ.
In the following, we extend the representation to the whole domain 𝒜. For this pur-
pose, for any ρ ∈ Δ(ℱ), define  v 1 (ρ) = U ( ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f )f  ) ,  v 2 (ρ) =  ∑ f∈ℱ   ρ( f )U( f ) , 
and v(ρ) = ( v 1 (ρ),  v 2 (ρ)). For any A ∈ 𝒜, define  A * by (5) in the sketch of proof. 
Note that since Δ(A) is compact and v is continuous in Δ(A),  A * is compact.14
14  Since S is finite and A is compact, Δ(A) is compact. To see v is continuous, define  u p ( f) =  ∑ s∈S     p(s) f(s) for 
all p ∈ C; and define  u ˆ p (μ) =  ∑ f∈ℱ     μ( f)  u p ( f) for all μ ∈ Δ(A) and p ∈ C. Note that with the Euclidean metric, 
u p ( f) is continuous with respect to f. Moreover,   u p ( f) is bounded in Δ(A). Therefore, with the weak convergence 
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We say that  A * dominates  B * if for all v ∈  B * there exists u ∈  A * such that 
 u 1 ≥  v 1 and  u 2 ≥  v 2 . We show two preliminary lemmas before obtaining the desired 
representation on 𝒜.
LEMMA 7: (i) If  A * dominates  B * , then U(A) ≥ U(B); (ii) If  A * ⊃  B * then 
U(A) ≥ U(B); (iii) For all ρ ∈ Δ(ℱ),  v 1 (ρ) ≥  v 2 (ρ); and (iv) ma x v∈ A *     v 1 ≥ 
U(A) ≥ ma x v∈ A *     v 2 .
Note that Lemma 7 (ii) shows that if  A * =  B * , then U(A) = U(B).
Remember that we fixed  f * ,  g * ∈ ℱ such that  1 _2   f * +  1 _2  g * ≻  f * ~  g * . Let α * ∈ arg ma x α∈[0, 1]   U(α  f * + (1 − α) g * ). For simplicity, assume U(  f * ) = 0 and 
U( α *  f * + (1 −  α * ) g * ) = 1 without loss of generality.15 For all β ∈ [0, 1], define 
f [β] = β  f * + (1 − β)x( f * ) and g[β] = β g * + (1 − β)x( g * ). (We use the notation 
f [β] instead of f(β) to avoid confusion because f(s) ∈ ℝ for each s ∈ S.) Given the 
definitions, by using Lemma 6, we obtain (i) in the next lemma. (ii) follows from 
Certainty Strategic Rationality.
LEMMA 8: (i) For any β ∈ (0, 1], { f [β], g[β] } * = co({(0, 0), (β, 0)}) and 
U({ f [β], g[β]}) = δβ; (ii) For any β ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ 𝒰, { f [β], g[β], (x, … , x) } * 
= co({(0, 0), (β, 0), (x, x)}).
By using Lemma 7 and 8, we establish the desired representation on 𝒜 in the 
next lemma.
LEMMA 9:
For all A ∈ 𝒜, U(A) = ma x ρ∈Δ(A)   δU ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )f ) + (1 − δ)  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )U( f ).
In the following, we provide the proofs of main lemmas. We omit the proofs of 
Lemmas 1 and 2. The proofs are standard and in the online Appendix.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3:
For any ρ ∈ Δ(ℱ), U ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )f ) ≥  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) U( f ), where the 
inequality holds by Jensen’s inequality. Hence, (i) holds. To show (ii), fix A ∈ 𝒜. 
Let  f 
–
 ∈ arg ma x f ∈co(A) U( f ) and  f _  ∈ arg ma x f ∈A U( f ). Hence, by (i), for any 
ρ ∈ Δ(A), U(  f – ) ≥ U ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f  ) f ) ≥  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )U( f ). Therefore, {(U(  f – ), 
U(  f – ))} dominates A and A dominates {(U( f _  ), U( f _  ))}. Therefore, by Dominance, 
U(  f –  ) ≥ U(A) ≥ U( f _  ). ∎
topology, by definition  u ˆ p (μ) is continuous with respect to μ in Δ(A). Finally, since C is compact under the product 
topology, Berge’s maximum theorem shows that  v 1 (μ) ≡ mi n p∈C   u ˆ p (μ) is continuous with respect to μ in Δ(A). 
In the same way, we can show  v 2 (μ) is continuous in Δ(A). Therefore, v(μ) = ( v 1 (μ),  v 2 (μ)) is continuous with 
respect to μ in Δ(A). 
15 This assumption is only for notational simplicity. Without this assumption, the proof goes through in the same 
way. However, we need to write U( f [β]) and U( α   * f [β] + (1 +  α   * )g[β]), instead of 0 and β, respectively. 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 4:
Suppose that U has an expected utility representation on ℱ. Then, there exists 
p ∈ Δ(S) such that for any f ∈ ℱ, U( f ) =  ∑ s∈S    f (s)p(s). Then U ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f ) 
=  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )U( f ). By Lemma 3 (ii),
 U(A) =  max ρ∈Δ(A) 
  U (  ∑ f∈ℱ
 
 ρ( f ) f ) =  max ρ∈Δ(A)    ∑ f∈ℱ
 
 ρ( f )U( f ). ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 5:
Fix A ∈ 𝒜. By using Dominance and Continuity, we can find f ∈ ℱ such 
that A ∼ f. Fix α ∈ [0, 1] and x ∈ 𝒰. Hence, by Certainty Set Independence, 
α A + (1 − α)x ∼ αf + (1 − α)x. Therefore, U(α A + (1 − α)x) = U(αf + (1 − α)x) 
= αU( f ) + (1 − α)x = αU(A) + (1 − α)x, where the second equality holds by 
the constant linearity of U. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 6:
Choose any { f, g}, { f ′, g′ } ∈ ℒ to show δ({ f, g}) = δ({ f ′, g′ }). Let α* 
∈ arg ma x α∈[0,1]   U(αf + (1 − α)g) and β* ∈ arg ma x β∈[0, 1]   U(β f ′ + (1 − β)g′ ). 
We show the lemma in the following two exclusive and inclusive cases.
Case 1: First, consider the case where U( f ) = U( f ′ ). Define x = U( f ). Without 
loss of generality assume that U(β* f ′  + (1 − β *)g′ ) ≤ U(α* f + (1 − α*)g). Define
 γ =  U(β* f ′  + (1 − β*)g′) − x   ______________________ 
U(α* f + (1 − α*)g) − x .
Then, γ ∈ [0, 1]. Define  f ˆ = γ f   + (1 − γ)x and  g ˆ = γg + (1 − γ)x. We show that 
δ({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) = δ({ f, g}) and δ({ f ′, g′ }) = δ({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) in the following two steps.
Step 1: δ({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) = δ({ f, g}).
PROOF OF STEP 1:
By Lemma 5, U({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) = γ U({ f, g}) + (1 − γ)x. By the constant linearity 
of U, α* ∈ arg ma x α∈[0,1]   U(α  f ˆ + (1 − α) g ˆ ).16 Moreover, U(α*  f ˆ + (1 − α*) g ˆ ) 
= γ U(α* f + (1 − α*)g) + (1 − γ)x and U(  f ˆ ) = γ U( f ) + (1 − γ)x. It follows 
that
 δ({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) =  U({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) − U(  f ˆ )   _______________________   
U(α*  f ˆ + (1 − α*) g ˆ ) − U(  f ˆ )
 =  γ(U({ f, g}) − U( f ))   __________________________   γ(U(α* f + (1 − α*)g) − U( f )) = δ({ f, g}).
Step 2: δ({ f ′, g′ }) = δ({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }). 
16 For all α, β ∈ [0, 1], x ∈ 𝒰, U(α(β f + (1 − β)x) + (1 − α)(βg + (1 − β)x)) = β U(α f + (1 − α)g) + 
(1 − β)x. 
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PROOF OF STEP 2:
First, we show { f ′, g′ } ∼ {  f ˆ ,  g ˆ } by using Dominance. By the definition of γ 
and the constant linearity of U, U(α*   f ˆ + (1 − α*) g ˆ ) = γU(α* f + (1 − α*)g) + 
(1 − γ)x = U(β* f ′ + (1 − β*)g′ ). By the constant linearity of U, U(  f ˆ ) = γ U( f ) + 
(1 − γ)x = U( f ′ ).
Now choose any ρ ∈ Δ({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) to show that β * f ′ ⊕ (1 − β *)g′ dominates 
ρ. Note that U(β * f ′ + (1 − β *)g′ ) = U(α*   f ˆ + (1 − α*) g ˆ ) ≥ U(ρ(  f ˆ )  f ˆ + 
ρ( g ˆ ) g ˆ ) and β *U( f ′ ) + (1 − β *)U(g′ ) = U( f ′ ) = U(  f ˆ ) = ρ(  f  ˆ)U(  f  ˆ) + ρ( g ˆ )U( g ˆ ). 
Hence, Dominance shows { f ′, g′ } ≿ {  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }. In the same way, we can obtain 
{  f ˆ ,  g ˆ } ≿ { f ′, g′ }. It follows that { f ′, g′ } ∼ {  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }, so that U({ f ′, g′ }) = U({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }). 
Therefore,
 δ({ f ′, g′ }) =  U({ f ′, g′ }) − U( f ′ )   _________________________   
U(α* f ′ + (1 − α*)g′ ) − U( f ′ )
 =  U({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }) − U(  f ˆ )   ________________________   
U(β*  f ˆ + (1 − β*) g ˆ ) − U(  f ˆ ) = δ({  f ˆ ,  g ˆ }).
By Step 1 and 2, we obtain δ({  f, g}) = δ({ f ′, g′ }).
Case 2: Next consider the case where U( f ) ≠ U( f ′ ). Without loss of generality 
assume that U( f ) > U( f ′ ). There exists x ∈ 𝒰 such that U( f ) > x > U( f ′ ). Then, 
there exist γ, γ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that γ U( f ) + (1 − γ)x = γ′ U( f ′ ) + (1 − γ′ )x. 
Then by Case 1, δ({γ f + (1 − γ)x, γ g + (1 − γ)x}) = δ({γ′ f′ + (1 − γ′ )x, 
γ ′ g′ + (1 − γ′ )x}). As in Step 1 of Case 1, we can show that δ({ f, g}) 
= δ({γ f + (1 − γ)x, γ g + (1 − γ)x}). In the same way, we obtain δ({ f ′, g′ }) 
= δ({γ′ f ′ + (1 − γ′ )x, γ′ g′ + (1 − γ′ )x}). Hence, δ({ f, g})=δ({ f ′, g′ }).
By the arguments in Case 1 and 2, we can define δ = δ({ f, g}) for any { f, g} ∈ ℒ. 
Finally, to show the representation, choose any { f, g} ∈ ℒ. By the definition of δ,
 δ =  U({ f, g}) − U( f )   ________________________   
U(α* f + (1 − α*)g) − U( f ).
By rewriting the equation, we obtain U({ f, g}) = δU(α* f + (1 − α*)g) + 
(1 − δ)U( f ). Note that U(α* f + (1 − α*)g) = ma x ρ∈Δ({ f, g})   U ( ∑ h∈ℱ   ρ(h)h) 
and that U( f ) =  ∑ h∈ℱ   ρ(h)U(h) for any ρ ∈ Δ({ f, g}). It follows that U({ f, g}) 
= ma x ρ∈Δ({ f, g})   δU ( ∑ h∈ℱ   ρ(h)h) + (1 − δ)  ∑ h∈ℱ   ρ(h)U(h). ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 7: 
To show (i), fix A* and B* such that A* dominates B*. Then, for any ρ ∈ Δ(B), 
there exists μ ∈ Δ(A) such that v1(ρ) ≤ v1(μ) and v2(ρ) ≤ v2(μ). Therefore, by 
Dominance, A ≿ B, so that U(A) ≥ U(B). Moreover, if A* ⊃ B*, then A* dominates 
B*, so that U(A) ≥ U(B). Hence, (i) and (ii) hold. Lemma 3 and the definitions of v1 
and v2 show (iii) and (iv). ∎
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PROOF OF LEMMA 8:
By the definitions, for all β ∈ (0, 1], U( f [β]) = 0 = U(g[β]) and 
ma x α∈[0,1]   U(α f [β] + (1 − α)g[β]) = ma x α∈[0,1]   βU(α f * + (1 − α)g*) + (1 − β)U( f  * ) = βU(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) = β. Note that { f [β], g[β]} ∈ ℒ. By 
Lemma 6, U({ f [β], g[β]}) = δU(α* f [β] + (1 − α*)g[β]) + (1 − δ)(α* U( f [β]) + 
(1 − α*)U(g[β])) = δβ.
It is easy to see that { f [β], g[β]}* ⊂ co({(0, 0), (β, 0)}). To show the converse, 
choose, v′ ∈ co({(0, 0), (β, 0)}). Then, U(g[β]) = 0 ≤  v 1 ′ ≤ β = U(α* f [β] + (1 − α*)g[β]) and  v 2 ′ = 0. Since U(α f [β] + (1 − α)g[β]) is continuous 
in α, by the intermediate value theorem, there exists α ∈ [0, α*] such that 
U(α f [β] +(1 − α)g[β]) =  v 1 ′ and αU( f [β]) + (1 − α) U(g[β]) =  v 2 ′ , so that 
v′ = v(α f [β] ⊕ (1 − α)g[β]). Therefore, v′ ∈ { f [β], g[β]}*. It follows that 
co({(0,0), (β,0)}) ⊂ { f [β], g[β]}*. This completes the proof of (i).
To show (ii), choose any β ∈ (0, 1] and x ∈ 𝒰. It is easy to see that 
{  f [β], g[β], (x, … , x)}* ⊂ co({(0, 0), (β, 0), (x, x)}). To show the converse, choose 
any v′ ∈ co({(0, 0), (β, 0), (x, x)}). If v′ ∈ co({(0, 0), (β, 0)}), then by the argu-
ment in (i), v′ ∈ { f [β], g[β]}* ⊂ { f [β], g[β], (x, … , x)}*. If v′ ∉ co({(0, 0), (β, 0)}), 
then there exists v′′ ∈ co({(0, 0), (β, 0)}) and γ ∈ [0, 1] such that v′ = γ  v′′ + 
(1 − γ) (x, x). By the argument in (i), there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that 
v(α f [β] ⊕ (1 − α)g[β]) = v′′. By the constant linearity of u, we obtain 
v(γ α f [β] ⊕ γ (1 − α)g[β] ⊕ (1 − γ)(x, … , x)) = γ v(α f [β] ⊕ (1 − α)g[β]) + 
(1 − γ)(x, x) = γ v′′ + (1 − γ) (x, x) = v′. Therefore v′ ∈ {  f [β], g[β], (x, … , x)}*. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 9:
Choose any A ∈ 𝒜. We show the lemma in the following two exclusive and inclu-
sive cases.
Case 1: First we consider the case in which δ = 0. For all α ∈ (0, 1), define 
 A α = αA + (1 − α) ( 1 _2, … ,  1 _2) . By Lemma 7 (iii), for all u ∈ A*,  u 1 ≥  u 2 . 
Moreover, since A* is bounded, there exists a positive number α such that  A α * ⊂ 
co({(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}). Let v* = arg ma x v∈ A α *   v 2 . (Such v* exists because  v 2 is 
continuous and  A α * is compact.) Since  A α * ⊂ co({(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}), it follows 
that  v 2 
* < 1. Define B =  v 2 * (1, … , 1) + (1 −  v 2 * ){ f [1], g[1]}. By Lemma 5, U(B) =  v 2 * + (1 −  v 2 * ) U({ f [1], g[1]}). By Lemma 8 (i) and δ = 0, U({ f [1], g[1]}) = 0. 
Hence, U(B) =  v 2 * . By Lemma 7 (iv), U(B) =  v 2 * ≡ ma x v∈ A α *   v 2 ≤ U( A α ).
Next we show that U(B) ≥ U( A α ). For all v ∈  A α *,  v 1 ≤ 1 and  v 2 ≤  v 2 * because 
A α * ⊂ co({(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}) and  v 2 *  = ma x v∈ A α *   v 2 . Note that B* =  v 2 * (1, 1) + (1 −  v 2 * )co({(0, 0), (1, 0)}) = co({ v   * , (1,  v 2 * )}). Therefore, B* dominates  A α * as 
shown in Figure 6. Hence, by Lemma 7 (i), U(B) ≥ U( A α ).
It follows that U( A α ) = U(B) = ma x v∈ A α *   v 2 = α ma x v∈ A  *   v 2 + (1 − α) 1 _2. By 
Lemma 5, U( A α ) = αU(A) + (1 − α) 1 _2. Hence, we obtain α ma x v∈ A   *   v 2 + (1 − α) 1 _2= αU(A)  +  (1  −  α) 1 _2. Therefore, U(A)  =  ma x v∈ A   *   v 2  =  ma x ρ∈Δ(A)  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )U( f ).
Case 2: Next we consider the case in which δ > 0. Choose a positive num-
ber ε such that ε < δ. For all α ∈ (0, 1), define  A α = α A + (1 − α)(ε, ε). Then, 
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ma x v∈ A α *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ)  v 2 = α(ma x v∈ A   *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ)  v 2 ) + (1 − α)ε. Since (i) A* 
is bounded, (ii) ε < δ, and (iii)  v 1 ≥  v 2 for all v ∈ A*, there exists a positive num-
ber α such that  A α * ⊂ co({(0, 0), (1, 0), (1, 1)}) and ma x v∈ A α *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ)  v 2 < δ. Note that U( A α ) = αU(A) + (1 − α)ε and ma x v∈ A α *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ)  v 2 = α(ma x v∈ A   *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ) v 2 )+ (1 − α)ε. Hence to show the lemma, it suffices to 
prove U( A α ) = ma x v∈ A α *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ) v 2 . Define U * = ma x v∈ A α *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ) v 2 . 
Then, U * < δ. We show that U( A α ) ≥ U * and U( A α ) ≤ U* in the following two 
steps.
Step 1: U( A α ) ≥  U ∗ .
PROOF OF STEP 1:
Let v* ∈ arg ma x v∈ A α *  δ v 1 + (1 − δ) v 2 . (Such v* exists because δ v 1 + (1 − δ)  v 2 
is continuous and  A α * is compact.) By Lemma 7 (iii),  v 1 * ≥  v 2 * . Define B 
=   v 2 *  __
 v 1 
* 
( v 1 * , … ,  v 1 * ) +  (1 −   v 2 *  __ v 1 * ) { f [ v 1 * ], g[ v 1 * ]}. By Lemma 5, U(B) =   v 2 
* 
 __
 v 1 
* 
  v 1 * + 
 (1 −   v 2 *  __ v 1 * ) U({ f [ v 1 * ], g[ v 1 * ]}). By Lemma 8 (i), U({ f [ v 1 * ], g[ v 1 * ]}) = δ v 1 * . Therefore, 
U(B) =  v 2 * + ( v 1 * −  v 2 * )δ = δ v 1 * + (1 − δ) v 2 * = U *. Moreover, B* =   v 2 *  __ v 1 * ( v 1 
* ,  v 1 * ) + 
 (1 −   v 2 *  __ v 1 * ) co({(0, 0), ( v 1 * , 0)}) = co({( v 2 * ,  v 2 * ), v*}). Since v* ∈  A α * and  v 1 * ≥  v 2 * , 
we obtain  A α * ⊃ B*. Hence, Lemma 7 (ii) shows U( A α ) ≥ U(B). It follows that 
U( A α ) ≥ U *.
Step 2: U( A α ) ≤ U *.
PROOF OF STEP 2:
Remember that U * < δ. Define D = {  f [ U * __δ ], g[ U * __δ ], (U *, … , U *) }. Then, by 
Lemma 8 (ii), D * = co({(0, 0), ( U * __δ , 0), (U *, U *)}). By the definitions of U * and 
v*, we obtain  A α * ⊂ D* (as shown in Figure 7). Therefore, Lemma 7 (ii) shows 
U( A α ) ≤ U(D). Hence, to show U( A α ) ≤ U *, it suffices to show U * = U(D). Since 
v*
B*
Aα*
(1, v2*)
Figure 6. Sets A* and B* in Case 1
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δ > U *, then ( U * __δ ) < 1. Define C = { f [ U * __δ ], g[ U * __δ ]}. By Lemma 8 (i), U(C) = U *. 
It follows that  (U *, … , U *) ∼ { f [ U * __δ ], g[ U * __δ ]}. By Certainty Strategic Rationality, 
(U *, … , U *) ∼ {  f [ U * __δ ], g[ U * __δ ],(U *, … , U *) } ≡ D. Hence, U * = U(D). ∎
C. Proof of Necessity in Theorem 1
We show that an RUA representation satisfies the two key axioms, Certainty 
Strategic Rationality and Dominance. An RUA representation trivially satis-
fies the other axioms. For all ρ∈Δ(ℱ), define w(ρ) = δu ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f ) + 
(1 − δ)  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) u( f ). Note that U(A) = ma x ρ∈Δ(A) w(ρ).
To show that ≿ satisfies Certainty Strategic Rationality, assume (x, … , x) ≿ B. 
Then, u(x, … , x) ≥ U(B) = ma x ρ∈Δ(B) w(ρ). Hence, u(x, … , x) ≥ w(ρ) for all ρ ∈ Δ(B). Note that w(αρ ⊕ (1 − α)x) = αw(ρ) + (1 − α)w(x, … , x) for all 
ρ ∈ Δ(B) and α ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore, u(x, … , x) ≥ w(μ) for all μ ∈ Δ((x, … , x) ∪ B). 
Hence, u(x, … , x) ≥ ma x μ∈Δ((x, … , x)∪B) w(μ) ≡ U((x, … , x) ∪ B), so that (x, … , x) ≿ (x, … , x) ∪ B.
To show that ≿ satisfies Dominance, fix A, B ∈ 𝒜 and suppose that for 
any μ ∈ Δ(B), there exists ρ ∈ Δ(A) such that ρ dominates μ. That is, 
u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f ) ≥ u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   μ( f ) f ) and  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )u( f  ) ≥  ∑ f ∈ℱ   μ( f )u( f ) . 
Since δ ∈ [0, 1], then w(ρ) ≡ δu ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f ) + (1 − δ)  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )u( f  ) 
≥ δu ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   μ( f ) f ) + (1 − δ)  ∑ f ∈ℱ   μ( f )u( f ) ≡ w(μ). Hence, U(A) ≡ ma x ρ∈Δ(A) w(ρ) ≥ ma x μ∈Δ(B) w(μ) ≡ U(B), so that A ≿ B.
D. Proof of Remark 1 (Uniqueness)
The uniqueness of C (i.e., C = C′ ) follows from Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). 
Let u and u′ be maxmin expected utilities defined with C and C′ respectively. Then, 
by normalization that u(x, … , x) = x = u′(x, … , x), we obtain u = u′.
Suppose that C is not a singleton. Then, there exist f   *, g* ∈ ℱ such that  1 _2  f  * +  1 _2 g* ≻ f  * ∼ g*.  Let α* ∈ arg ma x α∈[0,1] U(α f  * + (1 − α)g*). Define x = δu(α* f  *+ 
Aα*
( )δ , 0δ
δ
(U*, U*)
U*
B*
C*
D*
v*
(0, 0)
(v2*, v2*)
Figure 7. Sets A*, B*, C*, and D* in Case 2
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(1 − α*)g*) + (1 − δ)u( f *). Then, U({  f  *, g*}) = x, so that {  f  *, g*} ∼ (x, … , x). 
Hence, x = u′(x, … , x) = δ′ u′(α*  f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 − δ′ )u′( f  *}). Since u = u′, 
we obtain
δ =  x − u( f  *) _________________________  
u(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) − u( f *) =  
x − u′( f *) ___________________________  
u′(α* f  * + (1 − α*) g*) − u′( f  *) = δ′.
E. Proofs of Propositions 1– 4
First, we present a reminder for a basic fact: When C is not a singleton, there exist 
f  *, g* ∈ ℱ, and α* ∈ [0, 1] such that α* f  * + (1 − α*)g* ≿ αf  * + (1 − α)g* for 
all α ∈ [0, 1] and α* f  * + (1 − α*)g* ≻ f  * ∼ g*. Hence, U({  f  *, g*}) = δu(α* f  * + 
(1 − α*)g*) + (1 − δ)u( f  *).
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
First, we show (i). It is easy to see that if δ = 1 then ≿ exhibits Indifference 
to Randomization. To show the converse, let A = {  f  *, g*}. By Indifference to 
Randomization, A ∼ co(A). Therefore, δu(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 − δ)u(  f  *) 
= U(A) = U(co(A)) = ma x h∈co(A) u(h) = u(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*), so that δ = 1. 
Next, we show (ii). It is easy to see that if δ = 0, then ≿ exhibits Strategic 
Rationality. To show the converse, note that by Strategic Rationality, A ∼ {  f  * }. 
Therefore, δu(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 − δ)u(  f  *) = U(A) = U({  f  *}) = u(  f  *), 
so that δ = 0. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2:
Fix two RUA preference relations { ≿ i } i=1,2 represented by {( δ i ,  C i ) } i=1,2 , where 
C 1 =  C 2 .
Step 1: (i) ⇔ (ii).
PROOF OF STEP 1:
First, we show that (i) implies (ii). Suppose that  ≿ 1 exhibits a stronger 
 preference for flexibility than  ≿ 2 . Define u( f ) = mi n p∈C  ∑ s∈S   p(s)  f (s). In 
the following, we show  δ 1 ≥  δ 2 . Let  U 1 and  U 2 be the RUA representations 
with ( δ 1 , C) and ( δ 2 , C), respectively. Define x =  δ 2 u(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 −  δ 2 )u( f  *). Since  U 2 ({  f  *, g*, (x, … , x)}) =  δ 2 u(α*f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 −  δ 2 )u( f  *) = x, then {  f  *, g*, (x, … , x)}  ∼ 2 (x, … , x). Since  ≿ 1 exhibits a 
 stronger preference for flexibility than  ≿ 2 , then {  f  *, g*, (x, … , x)}  ≿ 1 (x, … , x). 
Hence,   U 1 ({  f  *, g*, (x, … , x)}) =  δ 1 u(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 −  δ 1 )u(  f  *) ≥ x. 
Therefore,
  δ 1 ≥  x − u( f  
*) _________________________  
u(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) − u( f  *) =  δ 2 .
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Second, we show that (ii) implies (i). Suppose that  δ 1 ≥  δ 2 and  C 1 =  C 2 . Define 
u( f ) = mi n p∈ C 1    ∑ s∈S   p(s)  f (s). Fix any A ∈ 𝒜 and g ∈ A such that A  ≿ 2 g to show 
A  ≿ 1 g. Then, for any ρ ∈  Δ  ≿ 2  (A),
  U 1 (A) ≥  δ 1 u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f )  + (1 −  δ 1 )  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )u( f )
 ≥  δ 2 u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f ) f )  + (1 −  δ 2 )  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ( f )u( f ) (∵  δ 1 ≥  δ 2 )
 =  U 2 (A) (∵ ρ ∈  Δ  ≿ 2  (A))
 ≥ u(g). (∵ A  ≿ 2 g)
Step 2: (ii) ⇔ (iii). 
PROOF OF STEP 2:
Note that by definition, for all i ∈ {1, 2},  Δ  ≿ i  (A) = arg ma x ρ∈Δ(A)  w i (ρ).
First, we show that (ii) implies (iii). Suppose that  δ 1 ≥  δ 2 . Choose A ∈ 𝒜 such 
that ( Δ  ≿ 2  (A))\ A ≠ ∅. Choose any ρ* ∈ ( Δ  ≿ 2  (A))\ A. Then,  w 2 (ρ*) ≥  w 2 ( f ) for 
any f ∈ A. Therefore,
  w 1 (ρ*) =  δ 1 u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ*( f ) f )  + (1 −  δ 1 )  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ*( f )u( f )
 ≥  δ 2 u ( ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ*( f ) f )  + (1 −  δ 2 )  ∑ f ∈ℱ   ρ*( f )u( f ) (∵  δ 1 ≥  δ 2 )
 =  w 2 (ρ * ).
So, we obtain  w 1 (ρ*) ≥  w 2 (ρ*). Since  w 2 (ρ*) ≥  w 2 ( f ) and  w 2 ( f ) = u( f ) =  w 1 ( f ) 
for any f ∈ A, it follows that  w 1 (ρ*) ≥  w 1 ( f ) for any f ∈ A. Hence, if there exists 
f ∈ A such that f ∈  Δ  ≿ 1  (A), then ρ* ∈ ( Δ  ≿ 1  (A))\ A ≠ ∅. If there exists no f ∈ A such 
that f ∈  Δ  ≿ 1  (A), then ( Δ  ≿ 1  (A))\ A =  Δ  ≿ 1  (A) ≠ ∅. (Remember that  Δ  ≿ 1  (A) ≠ ∅.) 
In either case, ( Δ  ≿ 1  (A))\ A ≠ ∅.
Second, we show that (iii) implies (ii). Suppose that  ≿ 1 exhibits a 
 stronger preference for randomization than  ≿ 2 . We show  δ 1 ≥  δ 2 . Define 
x =  w 2 (α* f  * ⊕ (1 − α*)g*) and A = {  f  *, g*, (x, … , x)}. Then, α* f  * ⊕ (1 − α*) g* ∈ ( Δ  ≿ 2  (A))\ A ≠ ∅. By way of contradiction suppose that  δ 1 <  δ 2 , then
  x =  w 2 (α* f  * ⊕ (1 − α*)g*)
 =  δ 2 u(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 −  δ 2 )u(  f  *)
 >  δ 1 u(α* f  * + (1 − α*)g*) + (1 −  δ 1 )u(  f  *) (∵  δ 2 >  δ 1 )
 =  w 1 (α* f  * ⊕ (1 − α*)g*). 
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By the constant linearity of u,  Δ  ≿ 1  (A) ≡ arg ma x ρ∈Δ(A) w(ρ) = {(x, … , x)}, so that Δ  ≿ 1  (A)\ A = ∅. This contradicts that  ≿ 1 exhibits a stronger preference for random-
ization than  ≿ 2 .
PROOF OF PROPOSITIONS 3 AND 4:
First, we show Proposition 4. If u (   f    Red ) = u (  f    Black ) , then mi n p∈C p(Red) 
= mi n p∈C p(Black). Hence, U ( {   f    Red ,  f    Black } ) = ma x α∈[0,1] w(α   f    Red ⊕ (1 − α) 
 ×  f    Black ) = w ( 1 _2   f    Red ⊕  1 _2  f    Black ) = δ  1 _2 + (1 − δ) ( 1 _2 mi n p∈C p(Red) + 
 1 _2 mi n p∈C p(Black)) =  1 _2 (1 − (1 − δ) | C |), where the last equality holds because 
mi n p∈C p(Black) = 1 − ma x p∈C p(Red). Since  1 _2 −  r  RedBlack = U({   f    Red ,  f    Black }), 
by the definition of  r  RedBlack , then  r  RedBlack =  1 _2 (1 − δ) | C |.
Next we show Proposition 3. Note that since mi n p∈C p(Red) = mi n p∈C p(Black), 
we obtain ma x p∈C p(Red) = 1 − mi n p∈C p(Black) = 1 − mi n p∈C p(Red). There- 
fore, by the definition of | C |, we obtain  1 _2 (1 − δ) | C | =  1 _2 (1 − δ) (1 − 
2 mi n p∈C p(Red)) = (1 − δ)  ( 1 _2 − mi n p∈C p(Red)) .
By the definition of  r  
Red ,  1 _2 −  r  Red = u(   f    Red ). Since u(   f    Red ) = mi n p∈C p(Red), 
we obtain  r  
Red =  1 _2 − mi n p∈C p(Red). Since u(   f    Red ) = u(  f    Black ), then  r  Red =  r  Black . 
Hence, min  { r  Red ,  r  Black } >  r  RedBlack if and only if  1 _2 − mi n p∈C p(Red) > (1 − δ) ×  ( 1 _2 − mi n p∈C p(Red)) if and only if δ > 0. ∎
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